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Abstract 
This article analyses a project by Finnish and Estonian unions to adopt ‘organizing model’ strategies 
through establishing the transnational ‘Baltic Organising Academy’. Initially aimed at Estonian 
workplaces, successful campaigns inspired Finnish unions to copy the model in Finland. This 
cooperation was originally motivated by labour market interdependence between the two countries, 
and the failure of past social-partnership oriented union strategies in Estonia. The willingness of 
Finnish and Estonian unions to commit resources to transnational cooperation around an ‘organizing 
model’ marks a dramatic departure from the unions’ previous strategies. This change was 
accomplished by transnational activists who have developed and raised support for the adoption of 
‘organizing model’ in the face of structural challenges and ideological opposition by some union 
officials. The project’s transnational organizing exemplifies one possible solution to union weakness 
in Eastern Europe, and underlines the importance of ‘identity work’ in building transnational trade 
union coalitions around organizing. 
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Introduction 
In 2010, a coalition of unions from countries in the Baltic region formed the ‘Baltic Organising 
Academy’ (BOA), in an attempt to halt union decline by introducing ‘organizing model’ strategies in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. While the project has so far had limited impact in the other Baltic and 
Nordic countries, the project inspired Finnish and Estonian unions to develop strong bilateral 
transnational organizing cooperation. For Finnish and Estonian unions implementing the BOA has 
involved not only reimagining union geographies, but reorienting union identities, away from social 
partnership and towards more confrontational forms of unionism. The Finnish-Estonian BOA 
cooperation is a rare example of sustained, successful transnationalism backed by high-level 
strategies, and fully implemented in action on the ground.  
 
The article argues that behind this success is a long process of identity work by Finnish and Estonian 
unionists, which pre-dates and extends well beyond organizing. Finnish and Estonian unions have 
overcome a ‘double barrier’ in developing cooperation around bi-national organizing. First, they had 
to overcome the national focus and insularity inherent to union activity. Second, they had to ‘sell’ 
their organizing project to union leaderships focused on social partnership and membership servicing. 
These adjustments have involved a process of ‘identity work,’ to build among Finnish and Estonian 
trade unionists an organizing mindset, and a cadre of unionists skilled in and committed to organizing. 
Although trade union survival and improved bargaining leverage provide the BOA’s rationale, the key 
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factor behind its success is ‘identity work’, through which trust has been established and common 
norms, objectives and identities have been (re)constructed. A cadre of transnational union activists 
have skilfully framed organizing as a viable approach in Estonia and Finland. Following Greer and 
Hauptmeier (2012), the article argues that ‘identity work’ is essential for initiating and sustaining 
transnational trade union cooperation.   
 
Estonia and Finland are linguistically and culturally similar neighbours, whose labour and product 
markets are linked by European Union (EU) free movement. Finland, however, has a comparatively 
high union density of 69%, while Estonia’s is 6% (Visser, 2015). Since independence in 1991, Estonia 
has become a magnet for Finnish capital, a source country for low wage migration into Finland, and a 
laboratory for Finnish multinational companies to try out non-union working practices. Finnish unions 
have aided Estonian unions since the early 1990s, trying to build in Estonia the industry-level 
bargaining and social dialogue typical in Finland. Since Estonian unions are weak, management has 
usually seen little reason to engage with them (Kall, 2017). While cooperation around social 
partnership in Estonia has failed, this history of cooperation has provided a shared background on 
which like-minded factions in both countries built in promoting the ‘organizing model’. The original 
idea was to implement the organizing model in Estonia but Estonian successes inspired Finnish 
unionists to imitate these practices in the very different environment in Finland.   
 
The article begins by describing the ‘organizing,’ ‘transnationalism’ and ‘social partnership’ frames, 
their compatibilities and tensions and then turns to explaining how ‘identity work’ can reconcile the 
tensions in service of transnational organizing strategies. Then follow sections describing case study 
methodology, the pre-BOA Nordic-Baltic union cooperation, the BOA’s genesis, the success and 
spread of the ‘organizing model’ in Estonian, and its imitation by Finnish unions. The study highlights 
the role of various aspects of ‘identity work’ in building and sustaining the transnational organizing 
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model and concludes with a discussion of the factors supporting the BOA’s success and assessing its 
long-term prospects. 
 
The Organizing Model 
The ‘organizing model’ is understood here in terms of both internal and external organizing 
(Connolly, Marino and Martinez Lucio, 2017; Heery, Simms, Delbridge, Salmon and Simpson, 2000; 
Hurd, 2004). Internal organizing refers to mobilizing and stimulating activism among already existing 
union members. External organizing describes practices that contribute to membership growth, such 
as targeted organizing campaigns in workplaces where there is as yet no union presence (Heery et al., 
2000: 996). Although the main focus of BOA has been external organizing (especially in low-density 
Estonia), internal organizing has also been relevant (Häkkinen, 2013: 11-13). 
 
The organizing model developed in the 1980s and 90s as a union response to the virulently anti-union 
environment of the United States (US). Advocates of the model have promoted mobilization of 
current and potential union members and a set of aggressive union tactics, which when taken together 
have improved union ‘win-rates’ in the National Labor Relations Board representation elections 
which are typically the focus of US organizing campaigns (cf. Bronfenbrenner, 1997). The model 
assumes a hostile management which unions counter by mobilizing rank and file workers. Unions 
organize in secret for as long as possible, preparing workers mentally for a management onslaught, 
researching the vulnerabilities of targeted firms and building rank and file organization. This process 
encourages workers to ‘reimagine’ their interests as collective and class-based, in opposition to 
management (Simms, 2012). In short, the frame takes conflict as given, and emphasizes tactics which 
have been proven effective (Bronfenbrenner, 1997), though under an admittedly narrow set of 
assumptions (de Turberville, 2004).  
 
  
5 
 
The model has been criticized on many fronts. Union officials focused on partnership and 
membership servicing sometimes oppose the organizing model because they believe it competes with 
their own goals and priorities (Fiorito, 2004). Although emphasizing grassroots mobilization, it is 
staff-driven, following a strict playbook, and implemented by professional organizers (Fletcher and 
Hurd, 2001). Unlike partnership, which focuses on process legitimacy and compromise, the 
organizing model emphasizes specific goals, and mobilizes resources such as staff, political influence 
and worker support, to achieve those goals. It requires unions to allocate resources which might have 
been used elsewhere. This is arguably facilitated by a strong central leadership (Krzywdzinski, 2010), 
which is however in service of a rank-and-file based mobilizing strategy (Milkman, 2006). The 
apparent uniformity of the organizing model as a one-size-fits-all approach belies the complex 
environments and organizing challenges unions face in difference contexts (de Turberville, 2004). 
Some question its potential to succeed as a macro revitalization strategy for the labour movement as a 
whole because the obsessive focus with organizing practice neglects broader issues of rebuilding class 
power (Simms, 2012; Simms and Holgate, 2010). Related to this, organizing is often seen only as a 
way to bring in new members and increase union density, leaving aside the issue of empowering and 
mobilizing existing union members (Connolly et al., 2017: 321-322).  
 
In practice unions adjust the model to local circumstances. Lessons from the ‘organizing model’ have 
proven attractive to unions in many countries, including highly regulated industrial relations systems 
such as the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark. Inevitably, this has involved adaptation to local 
conditions. The end goals of organizing campaigns differ from one country to another, since these 
usually involve building workplace institutions, and the forms these take depend on national labour 
law. For example, in Germany organizing emphasizes establishing works councils instead of signing 
collective agreements (Turner, 2009). For Dutch unions, internal organizing, or mobilizing and 
activating the membership, is usually more important than winning collective agreements per se, since 
  
6 
 
the legal extension of collective agreements means that workers are typically already covered.  
However, the enforcement of these agreements requires shop-floor union leverage which can be 
achieved through internal organizing, which strengthens the unions’ legitimacy by promoting reforms 
and democratisation within unions. This does not exclude external organizing, which the Dutch 
unions also do, to extend union representation and regulation to previously unorganized groups of 
workers (Connolly et al., 2017).  Arnholtz et al. (2016) note that organizing advocates in Denmark 
‘translate’ the organizing model in ways which legitimate it in the Danish context, selecting only the 
parts which they regard as well suited to Denmark’s high union-density, highly institutionalized 
context.  
 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) unions face weak institutional contexts and low union density. In 
some ways this environment is similar to the US, and could theoretically be fertile ground for external 
organizing. An important limitation has been, however, that CEE unions lack the resources for 
organizing. Furthermore, they are often caught in a tradition of servicing unionism inherited from 
state socialist times. Polish unions, and in particular Solidarność, enthusiastically adopted the 
organizing model in the late 1990s, inspired by international cooperation and the entrance of a new 
generation of unionist into union leadership. Polish organizing, however, has had to fight for its 
budget share and remains relatively small scale (Krzywdzinski, 2010). 
 
The Transnationalism Frame 
Compared to the organizing model, union transnationalism represents a broader field of activities, 
with more varied ideological underpinnings. While much of it can be understood as conventional 
trade union interest micropolitics within firms (Greer and Haupmeier, 2012), or the geographical 
expansion of union activities to regain bargaining leverage lost to globalization (Lillie, 2004), at the 
EU level unions push pro-integrationist and social dialogue agendas, shaped by the EU’s political 
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opportunity structure (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013). There is also an international 
campaigning undercurrent (Lillie and Martinez Lucio, 2004) and many examples of cooperation 
motivated by radical leftist internationalism (Durrenberger, 2009).   
 
It is unusual for unions to directly organize members across national boundaries. International 
organizing assistance usually occurs in partnership with local unions supported by foreign unions’ 
finances, training and sometimes solidarity. A recent failed effort proving the rule is the German 
construction union IG BAU’s initiative to establish a European Migrant Workers Union (EMWU). 
The EMWU accepted members from any industry or country, and tried to establish effective 
representation for Polish migrant workers in Germany. It encountered resistance from other German 
unions jealous of their jurisdiction. It also had difficulty recruiting migrant members. Its resources 
were eventually absorbed back into IG BAU (Greer, Ciupijus and Lillie, 2013). On the other hand, the 
London-based International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) Seafarers’ Section has maintained 
for decades a successful global bargaining system allowing for direct seafarer membership, although 
these bargaining rights are normally transferred to member unions. The ITF’s situation is unusual in 
that ’organizing’ is mostly through secondary action, so convincing the seafarers to join is useful but 
not essential (Lillie, 2005), obviating the problem of recruiting workers into a ‘foreign’ union.   
 
The Social Partnership Frame  
‘Social partnership’ in some contexts is defined as mutual gains bargaining (Kelly, 2004), but its 
Nordic implementation is heavily imbued with a social regulatory role for unions. In Finland, it is 
more common to use the term ‘labour market parties’, recognizing the role of regulated conflict in 
Nordic labour policy (Kettunen, 2012). Since industrialization in the 1970s and 80s, strong national 
social partner relations in Finland have been backed by a societal consensus supportive of the role of 
unions, and nearly universal union membership. Unions assure membership through shop steward 
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networks and a Ghent-system linkage of membership to unemployment benefits (Böckerman and 
Uusitalo, 2006). External organizing has not been important, because there has not been anyone to 
organize. Unions regard themselves as partners in national politics, with a role in shaping Finland’s 
political-economy and safeguarding its competitiveness. This role is sometimes at tension with 
collective action or ‘movement’ (Kettunen, 2004: 305), such as organizing often entails.   
 
In Estonia social partnership is weak – although unions strive for it – and at the national level often 
takes an ‘illusory’ form (Woolfson and Kallaste, 2011). With low membership levels and withdrawal 
of state support, Estonian unions have lost the financial stability and policy influence which was the 
legacy of their state-socialist heritage and subsequent EU promotion of their social partner role (ibid.). 
Due to employers’ disinterest, sectoral bargaining is rare and most collective agreements are company 
level. Unions mainly operate through peaceful collective bargaining and routine servicing of existing 
members. The lack of a union protest culture hampers the use of more aggressive tactics (Kall, 2017).   
 
Finnish and Estonian unionists value their membership servicing and social partnership regulatory 
roles, which involve a mind-set in conflict with that of the organizing model. However, in line with de 
Turberville (2007) servicing is not incompatible with organizing. Social partnership relies on union 
power resources (Turner, 1998), which in some cases depend on organizing. In the absence of union 
power resources, partnership either collapses, or becomes a legitimation tool for management or the 
state (Woolfson and Kallaste, 2011). The organizational infrastructure of social partnership and 
servicing, in the absence of continuing struggle to establish unions’ position in society, can over time 
result in unions no longer having the ability to mobilize workers. In such cases, implementing 
‘organizing unionism’ requires changes in union structures, personnel and identity (Voss and 
Shermann, 2000; Krzywdzinski, 2010). The introduction of organizing is sometimes opposed by 
unionists who believe it wastes resources which could be used for servicing, or disrupts existing trust 
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relations with management. These tensions between organizing, partnership and servicing are 
inevitable, and managing them is an integral part of adopting the organizing model.   
 
Identity Work 
Transnational union organizing cooperation requires organizational innovation both in terms of 
transnational linkages as well as the development of an organizing model. Both dimensions require 
‘identity work’, to bring about the oppositional and campaigning orientation needed to organize and 
deepen the mutual trust needed for successful transnational cooperation. ‘Identity work’ refers to 
‘anything people do, individually or collectively, to give meaning to themselves or others’ (Schwalbe 
and Mason-Schrock, 1996: 115). During the process collective (or individual) identities are created, 
sustained and modified (Snow and Anderson, 1987; Snow and McAdam, 2000). Identity construction, 
as a form of identity work is, according to Snow and McAdam (2000: 53), facilitated by framing, 
collective action, or a combination of the two. As concluded by Benford and Snow (2000: 612), 
‘framing processes have come to be regarded, alongside resource mobilization and political 
opportunity processes, as a central dynamic in understanding the character and course of social 
movements.’ Framing is a processual phenomenon entailing mobilizing ideas and meanings, with an 
important role for agency and the generation of interpretative frames for identity (and reality) 
construction (Benford and Snow, 2000: 614).  
 
The identity work concept has been applied to union transnationalism by Greer and Hauptmeier 
(2012), who emphasize its role in sustaining cooperation between unions in different production sites 
at General Motors (GM) Europe. They point out that transnational coalitions between unions lack 
institutional support and, following Cooke (2005), note that because of this, local unions face a 
prisoners’ dilemma when acting collectively. In order not to be undermined by management 
whipsawing, GM unions needed to change the rules of the game. Through identity work over time 
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GM unions have constructed a common interest and purpose, countering management efforts to 
confound their cooperation. This was accomplished through a framing and trust building process 
involving face-to-face interactions, formal and informal socializing, and educating and mobilizing 
workers (Greer and Hauptmeier, 2012). Identity work allowed the unionists to overcome the 
limitations of existing institutional infrastructure and embedded identities, permitting adaptation to 
changing productive structures and management strategies.  
 
The Double Barrier 
Transnational organizing involves overcoming a double barrier, to change into organizing unions and 
to organize workers in another country. In the current case, identity work enabled the unions not only 
to build cooperation by reframing their interests, but also shifted those unions’ identities to prioritize 
organizing, which formerly had been considered in conflict with their principles. Both Finnish and 
Estonian unions hold to their own versions of ‘social partnership’, and some unionists regard the 
organizing model as threatening to this.   
 
In some respects, the organizing and transnational cooperation frames overlap, in emphasizing trade 
union solidarity and mutual aide, as well as strategic innovation and adaptation to changing economic 
environments. Still, ‘transnational cooperation’ covers a wide variety of activities and perspectives 
(Lillie and Martinez Lucio, 2004) while organizing is focused. In the Finland-Estonia case previous 
cooperation was built on a transnational social partnership paradigm. Overcoming the double barrier 
required constructing the organizing model frame on top of an earlier process of transnational identity 
work, out of which a cadre of union officials and activists emerged committed to organizing and 
rebuilding union strength in a joined labour market.   
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Methodology  
The literature suggests that there are many barriers to implementing the organizing model in different 
national contexts and especially transnationally. The main question guiding the current research was: 
How have the Estonian and Finnish unions surmounted these barriers? Answering this question 
involved analysing the process of identity work and union strategic decision making, through 
triangulating three types of data sources: interview testimony, (participant) observations and 
documentary material over several years. Although Estonian unions were to some extent also 
supported by the Swedish and Danish unions, the article concentrates on the Finnish-Estonian 
cooperation as the most extensive one. It is acknowledged that one limitation of the study is that no 
detailed research was conducted on actors from other Nordic and Baltic countries, which would have 
provided more generalizability to the arguments.  
 
The case study draws on 16 in-depth interviews (conducted in 2014-2016) with trade union officials 
and organizers in Estonia and Finland, participant observation during organizer training and 
organizing visits to companies (in 2016), 26 interviews conducted with Baltic area trade unionists in 
2004-2005, cooperation workshops involving Finnish and Estonian unions (in 2004-2005) and 
documents such as BOA meeting minutes, progress reports and union newsletters. The 2014-2016 
data was collected with the aim of understanding the decision making process and strategy behind the 
implementation of the organizing model, and the development of Finnish-Estonian union cooperation.  
The 2004-2005 data was collected during an EU-funded Nordic-Baltic project ’Promoting 
Information, Consultation and Participation in the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Industry and 
Construction Sectors’ with the goal of tracking industrial relations developments in the Baltic States.  
The data was thematically coded and analysed to trace the development of trans-Baltic cooperation 
over more than a decade, to see changes in strategy, structures, and collective action frames.  
 
  
12 
 
Exporting the Finnish Model to Estonia 
Since the early 1990s, Finnish unionists have tried to guide the Estonians towards the Finnish model 
of coordinated industry level bargaining and social dialogue. Finnish unions tended to regard their 
system as a superior model for weaker labour movements to follow. This attitude fuelled a ‘big 
brother mentality’, assuming Estonians could follow the same path, minimizing cultural differences 
and local particularities (Skulason and Jääskeläinen, 2000). One official from the Finnish 
Metalworkers’ Union (Metalliliitto) critically explained this attitude:  
 
/.../ Look, [we told them] we are strong, we have high organization rates and the funniest part 
was that we insisted that they should have a dialogue with the employers, when the employers 
didn't want to have a dialogue with them. But we insisted that you should find a way to have a 
dialogue with the employers. (Metalliliitto official #1, January 2015) 
 
Finnish-Estonian union cooperation developed in the context of many EU initiatives, as well as 
multilateral cooperation between Nordic and Baltic State unions, under the Baltic Sea Trade Union 
Network (BASTUN), formed in 1999 (Schymik, 2013: 75). Finnish-Estonian cooperation was much 
deeper than these, having been developed through numerous bilateral initiatives as well. These 
include, for example, the Finnish unions establishing an information office in Estonia for Estonians 
considering working in Finland, and the Estonian Trade Union of Commercial and Service Employees 
(ETKA) and Finnish private service sector union PAM concluding an agreement in the late 2000s 
making it easier for ETKA members to join PAM when they move to Finland (ETKA official, 
September 2014). Notably, the Finnish Seamen’s Union (SMU) and the Estonian Seamen’s 
Independent Union (EMSA) have had a longstanding cooperation in representing seafarers on Baltic 
ships, which extended into shore-based hotels. Ships on Baltic Sea routes have frequently been 
  
13 
 
crewed by both Estonians and Finns, and their shop-floor representation has been a cooperative 
endeavour (EMSA’s president, April 2010).   
 
Prior to the turn to organizing there were scattered efforts to recruit Estonians with help from Finnish 
unions. For example, the Finnish Chemical Workers’ and Estonian Light Industry Trade Union shared 
the costs of a recruiter (EKTAL official, November 2005). The Finnish Metalliliitto and the 
Federation of Estonian Metal Workers' Unions (EMAF) cooperated by using the Finnish union’s 
leverage in headquarters to help organize Estonian subsidiaries. This strategy brought some growth in 
membership, but was later undermined by the dismissal of many Estonian union members (EMAF 
official, March 2005). Furthermore, the Estonian Trade Union Confederation (EAKL) and the Central 
Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK) organized joint events in 2005 on recruiting and a 
seminar on strike strategy (EAKL official #1, August 2006). These efforts demonstrated the 
recognition of the problem of low organization rates in Estonia, pointing toward a need for more 
systematic organizing (Häkkinen, 2013).    
 
Although Finnish-Estonian cooperation failed to turn around union decline in Estonia, by 2010, when 
the organizing model began to be considered, Estonian and Finnish unions had established a 
cooperation culture and personal contacts through joint activities spanning two decades. Although the 
interdependence of labour markets was an underlying motivation, the routines of cooperation made 
joint introduction of the organizing model possible:  
 
The Nordics motivation in the beginning was to protect their labour market, this is clear. 
From this initial motivation, friendships developed and a kind of routine that they 
support. (Association of Estonian Energy Workers' Trade Unions’ (AEEWTU) official, 
March 2015) 
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Constructing an organizing identity: the importance of framing 
The BOA began as a multinational effort involving several Nordic industrial, service and transport 
union federations. These met in 2010 and decided to invite Baltic unions into organizing cooperation 
efforts with Nordic union counterparts. Inspiration to follow the organizing model came from the 
American Change to Win (CtW) initiative. CtW European office staff also provided initial training. In 
2011 32 organizations joined BOA, including 11 Finnish, two Swedish, four Danish, six Estonian and 
two Lithuanian unions, the Association of Estonian Industrial Trade Unions, EAKL, the Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation and the Council of Nordic Trade Unions (Häkkinen, 2013: 6). 
 
The poor record of previous Nordic-Baltic union projects meant that Baltic unions needed to be 
persuaded to become involved in yet another one. Compared to the Finnish-Estonian relationship, 
cooperation between the Scandinavian unions and Latvian and Lithuanian ones was not as substantial. 
The Swedes proved reluctant to invest too much personnel-time (Metalliliitto official #1, January 
2015) and the Latvian and Lithuanian unions were also hesitant. Two Lithuanian industrial unions 
showed interest, however (Häkkinen, 2013: 6). The Latvians were least willing to take part, one 
reason being that they were concerned about being controlled by the Nordic unions. A former 
Estonian BOA coordinator related (December 2014) that the Latvians unequivocally stated ‘give us 
money and we will see ourselves what we will do, you are not coming to teach us’. In the end, the 
Finns, Swedes, Danes and Estonians moved forward with practical cooperation, and initial operations 
were therefore conducted in Estonia. The Lithuanians also undertook some less extensive activity, 
while the other participants decided mostly to wait and observe.    
 
The Academy was based on the principle that all participating organizations should provide resources: 
either finances, personnel, or both. For Estonian unionists who backed the plan, personal contacts and 
the history of cooperation overcame their initial scepticism: 
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In the beginning... I did not totally agree and I was not interested in taking part [in the 
BOA]. But from the Finnish side... I cannot say that they pressured me, but they said 
‘How come you are not taking part?’ We were old friends, right? (AEEWTU official, 
March 2015) 
 
In addition to personal relations, Estonian unionists cited low and declining membership, difficulty 
concluding collective agreements, financial hardship, and trends towards subcontracting threatening 
their future membership, as motives for joining. Even after BOA was initiated, its advocates had to 
‘sell’ it to other staff in their unions. Organizing was alien to many Estonian unionists and it needed to 
be framed in a way which would overcome the resistance of those sceptical about aggressive social 
movement tactics and symbolic protest. One unionist relates how some unionists reacted to these 
tactics: 
 
I remember in 2000 I suggested that we should start thinking about that kind of thing 
[organizing].... I was laughed at: ’You are talking madness, what is organizing? What the hell? 
We already have so many members. Members should come to us, we shouldn’t go to the 
members.’ We did those [militant] campaigns in the central federation. I remember there was a 
campaign by the nurses’ union in which we used a stretcher and put ketchup on it and the girls 
were lying on it. Ligi [Estonian right wing politician] had to jump over the stretcher and he was 
swearing ’nasty, nasty, nasty’. The conservatives on the board of central federation asked: What 
are you doing!?  You are going there with a coffin and you cannot do that! (former Estonian 
BOA coordinator, December 2014) 
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For the Estonians, introducing the BOA meant organizational transformation. Although some 
unionists were directly involved in the transnational cooperation, to succeed the organizing model 
needed domesticization into wider union circles, involving unionists who had not previously been 
involved. More dramatically, they had to be willing to try different ways of approaching workers and 
employers. For the Finnish unions, the decision was perhaps easier, since their initial commitment 
was primarily financial.   
 
Benford and Snow (2000) relate that framing can involve diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational 
aspects, which Finnish and Estonian organizing model advocates undertook together. The organizing 
model was first promoted in Estonia as a way to prevent Estonia becoming a union-free zone; Finnish 
adoption began later. One Estonian and one Finnish trade unionist who had studied the model and 
initiated the project became its main advocates. They diagnosed low union density and passive social 
partnership/servicing unionism as problems, framing the organizing approach as the only way to 
‘save’ Estonian unions. They publicized successful examples from other countries. This signalled a 
move away from the previous ‘big brother mentality’, as the Finnish model was no longer exemplary.  
 
The next aspect was prognostic framing or ‘the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem, or 
at least plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 616). 
The main BOA initiators laid out detailed plans for the ‘Organizing Academy’ which was introduced 
during numerous formal and informal meetings with union officials. They prepared training materials, 
so those who took part had a ready-made package to follow. Finally, motivational framing provided a 
‘rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action’ (ibid: 617), like emphasising the need to end 
the downward membership spiral, the interdependency of labour markets, mutual obligations and 
‘being in the same boat’.  
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Finnish unions were motivated by the competitive threat of a largely union free zone in the Baltic 
States. This was related both to capital moving to Estonia, and labour to Finland. For example, a PAM 
official pointed out that a two-euro-an-hour-salary in Tallinn is typical for a cleaner, while in Finland 
the minimum salary is 8,87 per hour (as per the collective agreement for commercial cleaning, 2013-
2017). Estonian migrants are a major group in low-paid service jobs in Finland (PAM, 2009). A PAM 
official related: 
 
If you think about the whole picture, course it would be to everyone’s advantage if 
there were functional labour movements in nearby countries, because there is freedom 
of movement of labour [within the EU]…so that the workers learn that they have 
rights in every country /.../ at the moment, some [migrants] know their rights here [in 
Finland] but don’t know that they have a labour movement in their own country, and 
they might not trust it there. (PAM official, November 2014) 
 
The Finnish Metalliliitto also emphasised the failure of the scattered campaigns and initiatives 
initiated by the Finnish unions in Estonia in the past, admitting that that despite long-standing 
cooperation between Metalliliitto and EMAF they had gained few new members: ‘We can keep them 
alive in that sense, the EMAF, but it doesn't lead us anywhere. We should do something differently.’ 
(Metalliliitto official #1, January 2015). The well-planned BOA initiative rationalized various union 
efforts and brought them under one strategic vision. A cadre of committed individuals initiated BOA 
through personal contacts built from past cooperation, and then set about domesticating the strategy 
through diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. This was solidified and sustained through 
collective action, described in the following section.   
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Engaging in collective action: BOA’s organizing in Estonia 
Campaign work started in Estonia in May 2012. The idea was that the Finnish (and to a lesser extent 
also Danish and Swedish) unions support the Estonians financially, through strategic information, and 
sometimes solidarity. The Estonians set up a campaign office, and planned and executed campaigns. 
Training was supported by all the partners. All participants committed to re-investing at least 35 per 
cent of campaign-generated membership fees into organizing (Häkkinen, 2013: 7). Finnish unions 
made bilateral agreements with partner organizations. For example, PAM financed one Estonian 
organizer’s salary, and contributed 10% of a Finnish official’s work time in Finland. They promised 
also to support ETKA in negotiations by providing strategic information (PAM official, November 
2014). 
 
The approach followed the organizing model archetype closely. By the end of 2014 Estonia had seven 
BOA organizers in services, transportation and manufacturing. Organizers, in collaboration with 
Nordic colleagues, strategically targeted companies with few or no union members, but which they 
believed to be ‘winnable’. Nordic companies were sometimes preferred because of the potential to 
pressure the Nordic management. They did not usually solicit Nordic union support openly, but the 
Nordic ownership may have accounted the Estonians’ success at obtaining ‘organizing neutrality 
agreements,’ in which management agreed not to actively oppose unionization. The reason for Finnish 
unions’ low profile was that in this way the Estonians could achieve and take credit for their own 
victories. Pressuring and picketing in Finland was available as a back-up strategy (PAM’s official, 
November 2014). Picketing by Estonian workers in Finland played a role in winning neutrality from a 
Finnish hotel company in 2015, and then a collective agreement in 2016.    
 
As is typical in the organizing model, the most important element was one-on-one conversations with 
workers, to determine the most important bargaining issues, to explaining what a union is, and to 
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build workers’ confidence in collective solutions. Organizing in a post-soviet context has its 
challenges: the younger generation generally had no knowledge of trade unions, while older 
employees still associated unions with their Soviet-era function of distributing goods given by the 
state. These one-on-one conversations also promoted a collectivist worker mentality versus the 
employer:  
 
[During organizing conversations organizer explains to the workers that] you basically have no 
other options [than the union] to improve your working life. You cannot stand and wait for the 
employer to come and pat you on the shoulder, say ‘good job, next month I will give you 100 
Euros more’. Those kinds of things do not happen. They are making profit, why should they 
change anything?  (BOA organizer #2, October 2014) 
 
Worker passivity and fear of employer retaliation made organizing difficult. As is common elsewhere, 
Estonian employers used ideological manipulation, such as labelling unions as communists and more 
direct opposition, such as inviting workers to one-on-one talks to pressure them not to join.  
 
A high priority was recruiting ‘natural leaders’, who organize other workers and eventually maintain 
union structures that can survive and grow after the organizer has left. Legally only five members are 
required to set up a union. In practice, however, campaigns aimed to build high density on-site 
organizations, with elected shop stewards and board members, committed members, the ability to use 
industrial action when necessary, and to sign a company-specific collective agreement (Häkkinen, 
2013: 11). Organizers started by organizing enough workers to have leverage over the employer, and 
only then contacted the employer. Campaigns also had other elements, depending on the specific 
vulnerabilities of employers, including employee petitions, wearing signs to express union support, 
picketing, and media pressure to draw attention to aggressive employer conduct.  
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Organizing Successes in Estonia 
The BOA’s annual report shows that by November 2014, in the third year of operations, 1234 new 
members had joined, 48 new shop stewards were recruited and 15 new self-sustaining branches were 
set up in Estonia (BOA, 2014). The aggregate numbers may seem small, but it is important to 
remember the total population of Estonia is only 1.3 million, and the labour movement is starting 
from a very low baseline.     
 
During this initial period, most successes were in manufacturing and transportation, while services 
saw less success. Partly, this was because the starting situation in that sector was so bad. Despite this, 
PAM continued to underwrite ETKA’s campaigns, because of what they saw as positive signs at 
targeted firms. Officials from PAM also emphasized that 2012 to 2014 was a learning period, during 
which the Estonian organizers’ professionalism increased (PAM official, November 2014). 
Preliminary numbers from 2016 now suggested that this patience paid off; ETKA, which had two 
organizers, organized 160 new members in that period (Mölder, 2016).  
 
The best example of BOA strategy’s success is actually its spillover effect – or frame diffusion 
(Benford and Snow, 2000: 627) – and comes from EMSA, outside the formal BOA program (although 
EMSA has since joined BOA). A former Estonian BOA country coordinator started working for 
EMSA – a union with close links to the Finnish Seamen’s Union – with the task of unionizing the 
Tallink Group hotels. Tallink is an Estonian ferry company. Using BOA tactics, he successfully 
organized the hotel staff and recruited a chief shop steward. EMSA won a collective agreement 
including a wage increase and other benefits (former Estonian BOA country coordinator, December 
2014). When Tallink fired a newly elected shop steward in spring 2014, EMSA mobilized support:  
BOA’s Estonian activists organized a picket, and requested solidarity from Finnish unions. The 
Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions SAK threatened to end its service contracts with 
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Tallink’s hotels and the Finnish Seamen’s Union threatened a secondary strike on its vessels. Tallink 
reinstated the shop steward. 
 
Participation in the BOA has also shifted the mentality of unionist not directly involved in organizing 
as such, as this quote – emphasising both external and internal aspects of organizing – from an ETKA 
official (September 2014) illustrates: 
 
/.../ in previous years... communication with workers was a bit superficial meaning that, 
well, let’s say a person came and wanted to join the union, we were really glad that he/she 
joined and we did talk a bit about unions, but we did not have so-called long and 
comprehensive conversations with workers. Moreover workers should realize that they 
are the union.  
 
Organizing also gained ground within Estonian trade unions outside the BOA. The main Estonian 
trade union confederation EAKL incorporated organizing elements into their general shop stewards’ 
training module. These were introduced in the trainings by BOA organizers (EAKL official #2, 
December 2014). 
 
There were detractors as well. Organizers reported that some officials continued to not support 
organizing, although in some cases this has lessened with organizing successes: 
 
/.../ in the beginning older coordinators were quite sceptical towards it [organizing]. Like what 
do you mean?... we have done things here certain way for decades and now some young guy 
comes and tells you have done everything the wrong way. /.../  now... it seems they are starting 
to understand why and how it works so that they have started even to use certain methods in 
  
22 
 
their work. But I have not been able to change them 100%. Those younger ones who joined 
later, they have come along with this thing [the organizing approach]. Older unionists are 
watching... how it goes for me and then well, they see that there are results and this probably 
increases their belief /.../ (BOA organizer #3, May 2015) 
 
Still, part of the opposition was not related to effectiveness, but rather approach and ideology. For 
example, two Estonian manufacturing unions quit the Academy at the end of 2014. One reason they 
gave was discomfort with the confrontational approach, including keeping organizing secret from 
employers (AEEWTU official, March 2015).    
 
The Spread to Finland 
The BOA has been a mutual learning process for the Finnish and Estonian unions, influencing the 
strategies of Finnish unions as well. Finnish and Estonian industrial relations contexts and organizing 
challenges are different. While Estonian workplaces are usually poorly organized, in Finland poorly 
organized workplaces are rare. Nonetheless, Finnish unions have been concerned about a lack of 
member engagement (i.e. the need for internal organizing), and many family firms and entrepreneurs 
remain staunchly non-union (Laurokari, 2016). Arnholtz et al. (2016) describe the Danish case, which 
is in many ways similar to the Finnish one. In that context, rank and file mobilization to establish 
union representation in previously unorganized workplaces has been virtually unknown in recent 
decades. The main issues which inspire mobilization in low-density contexts are usually already 
addressed in Denmark. Contracts are agreed at the industry level and workers have access to union 
representation if they want it. While unions see worker mobilization as necessary to build power 
resources to maintain and improve conditions, guaranteed representation promotes a passive mentality 
in the workers (Arnholtz et al., 2016). 
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Finnish unions also benefit from high-density passive recruitment environment, where members come 
to the union for unemployment benefits and representation services, rather than the union coming to 
them. This promotes membership, but discourages engagement. As with the Danish organizing 
advocates (Arnholtz et al., 2016), Finnish organizing model advocates pointed out that organizing is 
not alien to Finland, but rather invokes methods and ideologies of the labour movement’s formative 
years (Pietarinen, 2014), drawing on this older tradition to legitimate organizing. One of the BOA 
initiators, Mika Häkkinen (2016: 12) stated in the metalworkers’ union newsletter: ‘It is not a question 
of something new. For example, Finnish unions before the Second World War had organizers whose 
job was to found new union structures’.   
 
Metalliliitto was the first to adopt organizing model tactics. Their local officials were at first hesitant, 
but opinions became more positive when the results of the Estonian campaigns emerged (Metalliliitto 
official #3, March 2015). During the first year in the Metalliliitto’s campaign, the number of shop 
stewards increased by 100 and the number of new members in targeted firms was 200 (Pietarinen, 
2014). Although the outcome has been modest in terms of increased membership levels (i.e. external 
organizing), internal organizing has had promising results. The BOA-inspired campaign has made 
union people change their attitudes towards recruitment (Metalliliitto official #3, March 2015). In 
2016 PAM also trained its staff in basic organizing model principles and around 20 people who use 
organizing in their work also received advanced training. They were widening the scope of organizer 
training and organizing activities in 2017 (PAM official, December 2016).   
 
Conclusions 
This article seeks to explain how Finnish and Estonian union have overcome the double barrier to 
transnational organizing cooperation through identity work. The study concludes that the underlying 
need to increase union leverage has provided motivation to try the organizing model, but it could only 
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be successfully implemented through an extended process of identity work, in which old ideas about 
national jurisdictions and social partnership have been contested by new ideas of international 
cooperation and aggressive campaigning. Finnish unions’ motives first and foremost have been 
related to the competitive threat posed by competition from non-union Estonians. For Estonian 
unions, the BOA has been a reaction to declining membership. Despite the bargaining logic, the 
change of strategy has been neither automatic nor inevitable, but has required extensive identity work 
on both sides of the Gulf of Finland.   
Furthermore, the organizing model ideas have been tested in action, as successful identity work to (re-
)construct identities presumes simultaneous processes of framing and engagement in collective action 
(Snow and McAdam, 2000). Personal contacts and long-established cooperation have played a central 
role in beginning and sustaining the BOA. The Finnish unions have given the Estonian unions 
resources, but also taken a step back and let the Estonians run the campaigns, so that it has been a 
mutual learning process, rather than being dominated by the stronger union movement. The Estonian 
unions had to justify the trust put in them by assuming the organizing model agenda. This trust and 
commitment was only possible because of the years of identity work preceding the BOA. The 
Scandinavians lack such strong bond with Latvia and Lithuania, explaining why the Academy has not 
enjoyed similar success there.  
 
The need for a new, dynamic strategy had been advocated by a few ‘old-school’ Finnish and Estonian 
trade unionists who had studied the model elsewhere in Europe, and believed it could work in Baltic 
and Nordic countries as well. This underlines the importance of agents in promoting ideas of change 
(Hauptmeier and Heery, 2014), the need for constant identity work to (re-)create common 
understandings and objectives (Greer and Hauptmeier, 2012) and the socialization of old and new 
union members into accepting these. As the approach is considerably different from how unionists’ 
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have seen their and their organizations’ role this far, it takes skilful framing (e.g. referring to 
organizing as return to the origins for Finnish unions, or as an only way to save Estonian unions) by 
the main advocates of the approach to legitimize the more confrontational strategy and ensure its 
continuity. 
 
Identity work is a contested process and some changes are easier to achieve than others, depending on 
their fit with the past frames and narratives of those whose views are to be changed. Older generation 
partnership-servicing oriented unionists might see the need to organize, but confronting and 
pressuring employers is another and more difficult step. This generates tensions between those 
favouring more aggressive organizing and those who cling to existing union identities. The latter 
group opposes aggressive tactics, even when these clearly bring gains for workers. To certain extent 
the BOA has resolved this by being organizationally separate from other parts of the union movement, 
allowing freedom of action and limiting opposition, at the cost of making the number of ‘identity 
work subjects’ smaller. If the model is to become general it is necessary to reconnect it to the rest of 
the union movement. This is probably the BOA’s most crucial future challenge.    
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